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Rachel Brewster*
Abstract
International coruption law is a growing, f understudied, area of international economic
law. This Article examines Iwo aspects of governments' enforcement of the OECD's Anti-
Bribery Convention. The first aspect is the member state's eforts to enforce its own national
legislation prohibiting foreign corruption within its territory and with regards to its nationals
doing business abroad. The OECD Treaty's obligation concerning member states' enforcement
of their own national legislation is somewhat ambiguous. While the obligation to pass
particular national legislation is quite clear and specijic, the treaty does not speci@ what
resources that a state must dedicate to internally enforcdng these laws. As a result, states may
have robust anti-corruption laws on the books but fail to enforce them in a meaningful way.
This is more than an abstract concern. As of 2013, less than half of the states party to the
OECD Treaty had successfuly prosecuted a private actorforforeign corruption. This Article
also discusses a second aspect of enforcement: how these internal enforcement ambiguities hamper
state-to-state efforts to enforce the agreement. States cannot easily identi,5 whether other states
are breaching the treaty's oblgations when the internal enforcement oblgations are opaque.
This complicates international eforts to pressure other states to increase their compliance
through retaliation or recaprociy. This Article concludes by discussing enforcement alternatives,
namely the continued egorous Ameican enforcement of anti-corruption poliies against private
actors, even for activities having minimal territoial ties.
Professor, Duke Law School; Co-Director of the Duke Center for International and Comparative
Law. I would like to thank all of the participants of the University of Chicago's Conference on the
Economic Foundations of International Law for their comments and suggestions. All errors
remain my own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Economic Foundations of International Law, Eric Posner and Alan Sykes
provide an extensive overview of the application of economic reasoning to the
development of international law. The book surveys a host of areas from
security and the rules of war, to environmental and human rights concerns. One
of the areas that the economic approach to legal development has been the most
successful is in international economic law. At the outset, the background
justification for international cooperation is overwhelmingly economic.
Economic theory predicts that freer trade or greater access to capital investment
leads to economic growth and greater net national welfare. These welfare effects
are the driving motivation for trade or investment treaties. Empirical questions
about causal relationships between a treaty's terms and the agreement's welfare
effects can thus undermine support for the agreement. For example, the growing
empirical literature on the relationship between foreign direct investment and
economic growth in the host state raises concerns in some quarters about the
utility of bilateral investment agreements.2
In addition, economic analysis provides expectations about the negotiating
process and the effects of specific treaty terms on institutional design elements.
With respect to negotiations, economic frameworks tend to focus on the
structure of the cooperation problem3 : are the benefits of international
cooperation excludable? Are the actions of states easily observable? Are states
uncertain of the potential distributional effects of the agreement?' The elements
of problem structure can influence who is invited to the negotiating table as well
as institutional design choices. For instance, the benefits of trade agreements are
1 Of course, there can be subsidiary political motivations for these agreements, such as credibly
committing the state to a policy path. See FREDERICK MAYER, INTERPRETING NAFTA: THE
SCIENCE AND ART OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1998). Most commonly, the public justifications are
welfare oriented.
2 See Anne van Aaken, Smart Flexibility Clauses in International Investment Treaties and Sustainable
Development: A Functional View (Univ. of St. Gallen Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 2013-
18, 2013); Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some
HintsfromAlternative Evidence, 51 VA.J. INT'L L. 397 (2010).
3 See KAI. RAUSTIAIA & ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, International Law, International Relations and
Compliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONs 538-58 (Walter Carlsnaes et al.
eds., 2002) (focusing on problem structure). For examples of the effect of problem structure on
institutional design from the law and economics tradition, see ROBERT E. SCort & PAUL B.
STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRAcT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL. LAW (2006) (discussing the form of dispute resolution); Alan 0. Sykes, Public
versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631
(2005) (discussing access to dispute resolution in different economic regimes).
4 See Barbara Koremenos, Loosening the Ties that Bind.: A Learning Model of Agreement Fkxibity, 55
INT'L ORG. 289 (2001).
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more excludable than the benefits of climate change mitigation and thus trade
agreements can often take place at the bilateral or regional level while climate
negotiations are almost always global. Similarly, economic analysis may also lead
us to expect that some substantive obligations are more desirable than others.
For instance, the use of a Most Favored Nation (MFN) provision, while not a
necessary element of economic liberalization, provides several attractive
qualities-such as the extension of liberalizing policies to all regime members
and a limit on trade diversion-and is therefore commonly observed in both
international trade and international investment agreements.5
This short Article seeks to expand upon Posner and Sykes's work by
providing a first cut at an economic analysis of a relatively recent but rapidly
expanding area of international economic law: anti-corruption treaties. In
particular, this article examines the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development's Anti-Bribery Convention, thus far the most important anti-
corruption agreement.' The OECD Treaty requires member states to adopt
specific legislation that prohibits private actors from bribing or offering bribes to
foreign government officials.' While the treaty's standard for conforming
national legislation is quite clear, the standard for internally enforcing such national
legislation is far less explicit.' That is, what measures governments must actively
take to investigate and prosecute private activity within their jurisdiction (or by
their nationals acting abroad) is ambiguous. Governments may formally comply
with the treaty by nationally enacting all of the necessary domestic laws and, yet,
fail to meaningfully comply with the treaty by engaging in either no or very low
levels of enforcement. This is not simply a theoretical concern. As of December
2012, fifteen years after the Convention's signing, well over half of the states
that have joined the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention have never prosecuted a
domestic individual or firm for foreign corruption.' Such government reluctance
5 See ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN 0. SYKES, EcONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 269-
70 (2012).
6 Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention].
7 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 6, arts. 1-3.
8 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 6, art. 5.
9 See The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Working Givup on Bribeg:
2012 Data on Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention (une 2013). As of December 2012,
only thirteen member states have convicted an individual or firm for foreign corruption. In
addition, three member states (the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Turkey) have each
brought only one prosecution that ended in an acquittal. Id. at 4. The OECD Working Group on
Bribery reports that twenty four member states had on-going investigations in foreign corruption
by the end of 2012 but what percentage of these will result in prosecutions is uncertain. Id. at 2.
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to dedicate resources to enforcing domestic anti-corruption laws undermines the
effectiveness of the agreement. 0
This Article seeks to analyze the effects of the treaty's "internal
enforcement ambiguities" on interstate efforts to encourage greater compliance
with anti-corruption norms. First, this Article examines what the treaty actually
requires of states in terms of government enforcement against private actors
(that is, how a national government implements foreign anti-corruption
measures within its own jurisdiction). The Article then considers the effects of
these internal enforcement ambiguities on the interstate enforcement of the
treaty agreement: namely, how states responded to its treaty partners'
compliance or noncompliance with the international agreement. As a matter of
terminology, this Article refers to "internal enforcement" as a national
government's decision- (or sub-national government decisions) to make
enforcement of anti-corruption law a priority or not. "External enforcement"
refers to the state-to-state efforts to enforce the treaty among other member
states.
The OECD Anti-Bribery treaty is a form of international economic law but
it is different than most international economic obligations in that it regulates
activity that is out of the direct control of the state. The relevant transaction-a
private party bribing or offering to bribe a foreign government official-is a
private, not a government, action. Thus a government regulating foreign bribery
cannot comply with the goals of the treaty by simply altering its own immediate
actions. Instead, the regulating government must dedicate resources to
monitoring private activities, investigating claims, and prosecuting alleged
violators.
Such questions concerning how governments choose to spend their limited
resources-what issues to prioritize, what systems to develop-are rarely
addressed in anti-corruption treaties (or other agreements that require such
"market-engaging" legislation). This leaves significant ambiguity in the treaty
regime about what measures are required by international law. Is the adoption of
national legislation alone sufficient? Is there a background rule that demands a
certain level of enforcement? If so, what is the source of such a background rule
and how do we ascertain the content of this obligation? The lack of clarity of an
enforcement obligation (or more specifically, the lack of standard for evaluating
whether a state is enforcing its own laws) creates an uncertain environment for
io See Mark Pieth & Huguette Labelle, Making Sure that Bribes Don't Pay, TRuSTLAW (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://www.trust.org/item/?map=viewpoint-making-sure-that-bribes-dont-pay (noting that
"[the] lack of consistent enforcement endangers the success of the [OECD] Convention ... .
Unless the prohibition against foreign bribery is applied consistently, there will be a race to the
bottom from which it will be practically impossible to recover.").
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the implementation of anti-corruption laws. In addition, the external interstate
enforcement of these agreements is made more difficult because states do not
have clear expectations about what actions treaty partners are required to adopt.
This Article addresses these enforcement issues in three sections. Section II
situates "market-engaging" agreements in the broader field of international
economic law. Traditionally, international economic rules have governed activity
that the state directly controlled-such as tariff rates, government regulations of
goods, or state actions to expropriate property. These measures were designed to
limit the state's intervention into markets. A newer generation of international
economic law has moved beyond these market-disengaging obligations to a new
set of obligations that require governments to intervene in private market
behavior. This section traces the evolution of the move to the new obligations.
Section III provides a more in-depth discussion of current anti-corruption
law. The United States was the first nation to enact rigorous legislation aimed at
prohibiting private actors from making illegal payments to foreign government
officials." Once the United States adopted anti-corruption legislation, it had an
economic interest in having other states adopt similar measures and vigorously
advocated for a multilateral anti-corruption treaty. Other scholars have described
the politics of this treaty negotiation as a prisoner's dilemma game, where the
parties can achieve gains through collective action but each has an incentive to
resist the legal obligation.12 This section extends the analysis to the post-
negotiation process and discusses the internal enforcement dilemma that
governments face regarding implementation of anti-corruption policies.
Section IV concludes by discussing the impact of this internal enforcement
ambiguity on interstate efforts to promote the goals of the treaty. Various non-
governmental organizations, most notably Transparency International, have
designed their own indexes of state enforcement to encourage and shame
governments into dedicating greater resources towards implementation efforts.
Yet these indexes do not necessarily align with the treaty's legal obligations. As
such, governments cannot use these indexes to externally sanction governments
who devote few resources towards enforcement. This section ends with a
discussion of the enforcement alternatives, namely the continued rigorous
American enforcement of anti-corruption policies even for activities having
minimal territorial ties.
11 See Paul B. Stephan, Regulatoy Copetiion andAnticormption Law, 53 VA.J. INT'L L. 53, 53 (2012).
12 See Daniel K. Tarullo, The limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD Ant-Bribey
Convention, 44 VA.J. INT'L L. 665 (2004).
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II. A NEW WAVE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW OBLIGATIONS
The contours of international economic law have changed considerably in
the last two decades. The early push in international economic law was for the
restriction of government action in markets. These agreements represented
cooperation on the "easiest" issues. States agreed to lower government-imposed
barriers to trade. These treaty obligations were relatively transparent and only
covered behavior that the state directly controlled." For instance, governments
established tariff levels that were negotiated progressively lower during
successive General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rounds. 4 The
GATT agreement similarly eliminated quantitative restrictions on trade (quotas)
and discriminatory internal taxes." As these early and easy gains were realized,
newer international agreements have begun to engage more complicated
economic relationships.16
A new generation of international agreements seeks to re-engage
governments in regulating private market activity. These treaties, including
bilateral agreements on antitrust rules, multilateral agreements on anti-corruption
law, and aspects of multilateral intellectual property agreements, require
governments to monitor private activity and intervene to prevent or punish
certain transactions. As compared to trade or investment law, the obligations
contained in these agreements are much less clear-making monitoring of
government compliance more difficult-and cover issues that the state can
control only by indirect means." This section compares these two types of
agreements and discusses the challenges posed by this new wave of economic
agreements.
A. Trade and Investment Treaties
As a generalization, foundational economic agreements in international law
focused on the withdrawal of governments from national markets. The first
13 See POSNER & SYKES, supra note 5, at 268 (discussing the transparency of government-mandated
tariff levels).
14 See id. at 266; MICHEAL TREBILCOCK, ROBERT HowsE, & ANTONIA ELIASON, THE REG[LATION
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 24 (4th ed. 2013).
'5 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. III & XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194.
16 See POSNER & SYKES, supra note 5, at 266 (discussing concerns with non-tariff barriers to trade
that were not adequately disciplined by the GATI).
17 See, for example, Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefts to Developing Countries of linking International
Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 1, 17-26 (2011) (discussing the internal
enforcement ambiguities in the TRIPS Agreement).
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decades of the GATT negotiating rounds were dedicated to removing
government barriers to trade between national markets." Governments agreed
to channel market protection into tariffs and then negotiate down tariff rates.
Other forms of government protection, such as differential taxation of imports
or discriminatory regulation, were also limited by the GATT's national treatment
obligation." Similarly, international investment agreements restricted
government intervention ini markets.20 Investment agreements commonly limit
the conditions governments can place on incoming investment as well as the
types of measures that governments can impose on existing investments.
Traditional trade and investment rules generally only cover direct state
actions, not private behavior. If market participants wish to discriminate based
on national origin, the state has no obligation to police or prevent this behavior.
The general thinking is that private actors (but not necessarily governments) will
be primarily motivated to seek higher profits.21 Thus if there are greater
economic gains to be made through international transactions, private actors will
be ready to engage international markets and not prefer domestic transactions
that offer lower profit margins.22 As a result, GATT rules do not require
governments to enforce certain behaviors on private actors. For instance, the
U.S. government is not required to discourage an American labor association
from funding a campaign to "buy American" or to prevent a local NGO from
leading a boycott against foreign manufacturers.23
Monitoring government compliance with these traditional obligations is
also relativey simple. Governments publish national tariff rates and private actors
can readily discover discriminatory internal taxes or regulations. Of course, not
all trade and investment rules are crisp. Determining whether an internal tax is
discriminatory often turns on a multi-factor analysis of whether two differently
18 See TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 14, at 24.
19 Later trade agreements, such as agreements on subsidies (the SCM agreement) and non-facially
discriminatory domestic regulations (such as the SPS and TBT agreements) were similarly aimed
at restraining government intervention in markets. See POSNER & SYKES, supra note 5, at 273-77.
20 See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMic LAW 554-64 (2nd ed. 2008) (discussing
the restrictions on government action regarding foreign investment included in bilateral
investment treaties); POSNER & SYKES, supra note 5, at 288-89.
21 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Poliics, and the Allocation of Constitutional
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. Ruv. 345, 420 (2000).
22 Even if this is not true with every private actor, some entrepreneurs will be willing to engage
international markets. These entrepreneurs will then make above average returns and outperform
firms that have discriminatory preferences.
23 See, for example, Panel Report, Japan-Trade in Semi-Conductors, L/6309 - 35S/116 (May 4, 1988)
(interpreting GATT obligations only to apply to government action and not private action).
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taxed goods are sufficiently similar to be treated as "like."24 However, on the
spectrum from transparent to opaque legal obligations, traditional trade and
investment rules tend towards the more transparent pole, largely because
government intervention in markets is observable to interested private market
participants most of the time. Moreover, the baseline for determining the level
of required government compliance is well defined: governments are not
permitted to maintain any illegal measures even if complying with international
rules requires substantial resources.
B. Market-Engaging Agreements
Early international trade agreements were quite successful in lowering
formal barriers to trade. Over the course of many negotiating rounds, developed
states successively lowered tariff rates on manufactured goods to less than five
percent.2 Further cooperative gains from trade required measures that were
more invasive to domestic politics.26 These included reviews of non-
discriminatory state regulations-for instance, reviews of the scientific basis of
health and safety regulations-as well as limits on anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws. In addition, governments began negotiating treaties
that required state intervention in markets, sometimes as part of multilateral or
regional trade agreements and sometimes as stand-alone treaties. Three such
market-engaging issues are antitrust, intellectual property, and anti-corruption.
Each of these issues place obligations on governments to address private
activity, including private anticompetitive behavior, the unauthorized use of
intellectual property, and private corruption of government officials,
respectively.
These agreements create complex legal obligations. In one sense, the
treaties' requirements are incredibly sharp and transparent: the government has
an obligation to enact domestic legislation prohibiting certain types of
transactions. The existence (or not) of conforming legislation is readily
apparent.2 Other states or an adjudicator need only compare the text of the
enacting legislation to the treaty's requirements. Yet formal legislative
24 See, for example, Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Acoholic Beverages, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct.
4,1996).
25 See Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, What You Should Know About Globalzation and the World
Trade OrganiZation, 10 REV. INT'L EcON. 404 (2002), 407-8.
26 The push towards more market-engaging agreements was a mix of factors, including the success
of tariff reductions, the political push of protectionist demand into non-tariff barriers to trade,
and a greater public policy focus on "good" government institutions in addition to liberalizing
market reforms.
27 See, for example, Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, XVT/DS114/R
(Mar. 17, 2000).
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compliance is not the most significant part of market-engaging economic
agreements. The more complex and ambiguous part of the legal rule relates to
government efforts to monitor and change private behavior."
International economic obligations tend to be ambiguous regarding what
actions the government needs to undertake to enforce its own law. This is, in part, a
definitional problem of how to evaluate government efforts to control third-
party behavior. Assessing enforcement efforts is difficult without a clear baseline
established in a treaty because it is unclear which criteria should be used to
evaluate government's actions. Such an analysis could incorporate several
criteria, including the extent of a government's own efforts, the effects on
private activity, or the institutional design of the domestic measure.
To be clear, a treaty agreement could specify how domestic rules are to be
enforced. For instance, the TRIPS agreement takes a step in this direction by
outlining what remedies must be available to domestic judges adjudicating
intellectual property disputes.29 But these market-engaging agreements
necessarily involve issues related to the governments' approach to "rule of law"
issues, such as the role of prosecutorial discretion, the resources available to
police and prosecutors, and national law enforcement priorities. 0 Thus far,
treaty negotiators have been reluctant to enter this domain of national
governance. International economic agreements may demand that the state
adopt specific national laws but are less stringent in setting out how these rules
should be enforced against private actors within the state's jurisdiction.
This internal enforcement ambiguity makes a difference in the economic
analysis of these rules because it changes the dynamics of international
cooperation. Without sharper standards for evaluating the content of legal
obligations, there is greater room for self-serving interpretations of a state's
consistency with the treaty's policies. Even if states can establish third-party
dispute resolution systems to decide these issues (either on an ad hoc or
permanent basis), ambiguous agreements will necessarily require greater
delegation of law-making power to non-state actors. Ambiguous obligations are
also more difficult to enforce with reciprocity strategies. Reciprocity requires
28 See Brewster, supra note 17, at 17-26 (analyzing these complexities with regards to the WTO's
TRIPS Agreement).
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 41-50, Apr. 5, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197.
30 The commentary on the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention explicitly notes that the idea of
prosecutorial discretion is fundamental to national enforcement regimes and does not seek to
disturb it. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on
Combatting Bribeg of Foreign Public Oftcials in International Business Transactions and Related Documents,
I 27 (Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter OECD Treat and Commentary].
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being able to observe whether another party is abiding by its agreement and
tailoring the response to be proportionate to the defection. The less clear the
obligation, the harder it is for states to determine if there is a violation and what
a proportionate response involves (and to convince third-party states that
reciprocal action is justified and not itself a breach of treaty obligations). On the
whole, these agreements are less self-enforcing and require more costly
monitoring.
III. CURRENT ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES
This Section begins with an overview of the economic justification for anti-
bribery legislation. It highlights the collective action problems that states face in
their attempts to regulate foreign corruption. This Section then provides a brief
overview of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) including its definition of
corruption and its jurisdictional scope. It then turns to the OECD Anti-Bribery
treaty and discusses the competitive dynamics that informed its negotiation in
the 1990s and its current enforcement.
A. Economic Justifications for Anti-Corruption Law
Government corruption, most often defined as "the abuse of public office
for private gain," 3 1 is now widely accepted as economically inefficient. Instead of
allocating government resources based on economic calculations that maximize
benefits for the state, government officials maximize their own personal gain at
the expense of the public. The idea that public corruption is economically
inefficient was not always widely accepted. Samuel Huntington notably argued
that corruption permitted private actors to avoid inefficient local bureaucracies.32
The World Bank similarly viewed bribery as a welfare-increasing means of
accelerating major infrastructure projects." Presently, however, the standard
economic wisdom is that corruption harms economic growth and
development." This is true of large-scale bribery over procurement contracts as
31 THE WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD
BANK 8 (1997).
32 SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968) cited in Kenneth W.
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legaligation in the Fight Against Corption,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S141 (2002); see also J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 61 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 417 (1967) (noting that corruption could be beneficial as a means
of promoting entrepreneurship).
33 See discussion in Abbott & Snidal, supra note 32, at S158-59.
34 See Toke S. Aidt, Cormption and Sustainable Development, in 2 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE
EcONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 3-12 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Soreide eds., 2011) (reviewing
the literature on corruption and development); see also Pieth & Labelle, supra note 10, at 1 (stating
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well as smaller-scale payments to bureaucratic officials to avoid or speed up
documentation, although the former is viewed as more damaging than the
latter." Thus, in addition to any ethical, social, or moral justifications, one of the
background justifications for adopting anti-corruption measures is an economic
one: decreasing corruption will increase economic growth and national welfare,
particularly in developing countries where the problems of corruption are the
worst.36
The OECD Treaty only targets private actors' bribery or attempts to bribe
foreign government officials.3 ' Because the negative effects of national
corruption are shouldered by the domestic economy, internal social forces
pushed Western governments to adopt national anti-corruption laws (even if
these laws are not always enforced).38 However, foreign corruption has few
direct negative effects on the national economy and may even confer
competitive advantages (that is, the nation's corporations are able to sell more
goods and services because they win foreign contracts by paying bribes). As a
result, governments have not consistently prohibited foreign bribery, even as
they criminalized domestic corruption.39
Nevertheless, decreasing foreign corruption may be in states' interests if it
could be achieved collectively. Joint action could lead to beneficial effects,
including (1) greater foreign economic growth can benefit national economies;
(2) improved foreign government integrity can decrease political instability and
that "[i]t is now universally recognized that foreign bribery distorts competition, undermines good
governance, and hurts the most vulnerable").
35 See Pierre-Guillaume Meon & Khalid Sekkat, Does Corrption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth, 122
PUB. CHOICE 69 (2005) (reviewing the literature and independently finding that "grease" payment
harm growth even in non-democratic regimes).
36 Anti-corruption advocates also argue that anti-corruption measures increase the integrity of
corporate accounting systems and thus benefits developed states as well. See, general#, Benjamin
W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, Arrested Development: The Fight Against International Corporate
Bribey, 92 NATIONAL. INTEREST 80 (Nov./Dec. 2007). Recent studies show that bribery decreases
employee morale within company and thereby decreases the profitability of the firms. See, generally
Paul Healy & George Serafeim, Causes and Consequences of Firm Disclosures ofAnticorruption Efforts
(Harvard Business School Working Paper, 2011).
37 The OECD Convention only prohibits the "supply-side" of foreign bribery transaction. The
treaty requires governments to criminalize the private actors offering the bribe but does not
require the state criminalize the acceptance of the bribe (or request for a bribe) from the foreign
government official. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 6, art. 1 (only requiring
member states to regulate the "offer, promise, or give" a bribe); see also Pieth & Labelle, supra note
10, at 1 (stating that the "[the aim of the OECD Treaty is] to turn off the spigot on the supply-
side of global corruption").
38 See Heineman & Heimann, supra note 36, at 82.
39 Some states implicitly endorsed foreign bribery by making it a tax-deductible business expense. Id.
at 81.
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thus decrease negative externalities to neighboring states; and (3) less corruption
can improve access to foreign markets. In addition to these material incentives,
states may also consider moral arguments that tolerate their nationals' corrupting
influence abroad as not appropriate given international norms promoting good
governance.
Yet states' collective and individual interests in anti-corruption may
diverge: states may consider cooperation to decrease foreign corruption to be a
net welfare improvement over no cooperation, but each state has an incentive to
defect if other states are enforcing bans on foreign corruption. The defecting
state can benefit because the state's businesses can increase their proportion of
foreign contracts if they can continue to bribe while other states' businesses
cannot. This is a classic prisoner's dilemma problem structure where the
cooperative outcome is an improvement from a non-cooperative outcome, but
each player is better off if it can cheat on the cooperative agreement. In this
sense, anti-corruption cooperation is similar to the dynamics of international
trade cooperation. Abiding by the agreement provides net gains to all states, but
states are tempted to breach the agreement (particularly if the breach is hard to
detect) to improve their individual gains further.40
Several significant differences exist, however, and these differences drive
trade and anti-corruption cooperation towards varying cooperative dynamics.
Most importantly, anti-corruption measures have public-good type qualities that
make cooperation more challenging. Anti-corruption measures need significant
export state participation. The goal of this "supply-side" model is to eliminate
the supply for foreign bribes. For this to be effective, most states (or most
capital exporting states) need to participate. The effectiveness of the agreement
is undermined when there are actors outside of the cooperative agreement
continuing to supply bribes. This is not the case in trade agreements where gains
from liberalization can be achieved without the participation of a large number
of states.41
Second, the gains from anti-corruption measures are non-exclusive. States
cannot reap benefits by cooperating with a small group and excluding non-
cooperators from the benefits of the agreement. The benefit from anti-
corruption measures is greater efficiency in foreign markets, but access to the
foreign market is not a good that states, which adopt anti-corruption measures,
40 International trade is a prisoner's dilemma game from a political point of view where the
government prefers to export more and import less. From an economic point of view, states have
little incentive to cheat on the agreement. See Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate
About?, 35 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 113 (1997).
41 The gains from liberalization may be lower and there may be trade diversion, but preferential
trading arrangements can (but will not always) achieve economic gains with low levels of
participation. See TREBILCOCK et al., supra note 14, at 90-91.
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can control. Instead, anti-corruption measures generally require that cooperating
states restrict access to foreign markets with the goal of pressuring the target
state into implementing effective reforms. If the target state does decrease its
level of corruption, then the gains from these measures are available to all states
regardless of their level of contribution. Because benefits are non-exclusive,
states cannot enforce the agreement through reciprocity. Members of an
agreement cannot credibly threaten to cut defecting states out of the benefits of
cooperation. Certainly states can use sanctions external to the agreement in
crafting an enforcement strategy, but simple tit-for-tat strategies are ineffective.
An additional hurdle is that the relevant good-lower levels of foreign
corruption-is a much less divisible good than the good in trade agreements.
Trade agreements permit incremental gains. For instance, a trade agreement
offers gains to cooperating states even if the agreement achieves only a marginal
gain in liberalizing trade, such as a decrease in tariff rates of ten percent.
Corruption, by contrast, is a societal collective action problem and does not
respond in a linear manner to increases in outside pressure.42 Instead, gains from
ant-corruption measures are likely to proceed in step functions, where very few
gains are observable until the system achieves a new equilibrium.
All of these issues pose hurdles for effective cooperation. Collective action
is necessary to achieve gains-regional or minilateral efforts to dry up the supply
of bribes still permit non-cooperating states to supply the corruption market.
There are few unique gains to cooperation because the benefits are non-
excludable. The costs of enforcing an agreement are higher because intra-
agreement reciprocity is not an effective strategy. The benefits of small steps in
achieving the agreement's policy goals are lower because the good is less
divisible.
B. The FCPA and OECD Treaty
The pattern of international cooperation on anti-corruption measures has
developed differently than many international economic agreements in that it
began with a single state's unilateral action rather than bilateral or multilateral
action. The United States was the first mover in prohibiting private actors from
engaging in corrupt activity overseas. Congress passed the FCPA.43 in 1977 in
the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, which revealed that American
corporations had been paying bribes to secure overseas contracts. The FCPA
prohibits those covered by the act from bribing or offering a bribe to any
42 See Ajit Mishra, Persistence of Corruption: Some Theoretical Perpeceives, 34 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 349
(2006).
43 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at
15 USC § 78dd-1 et seq.).
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foreign officials to secure business abroad." A bribe is defined broadly: offering
"anything of value" to foreign officials, which has subsequently been interpreted
to include money, gifts, the employment of family members, or charitable
contributions. However, such payments only qualify as bribes if the payment is
illegal under the law of the foreign state. In determining the content of foreign
law, the FCPA looks to the written laws of the foreign state, even if these laws
are rarely, if ever, enforced.45 The term "foreign officials" is also defined broadly,
including government officials, officers of international organizations, candidates
for elected office, and employees of state-owned enterprises.46 Entities covered
by the law now include (1) U.S. nationals and resident aliens; (2) any entity
incorporated or with a principal place of business in the United States; or (3) any
entity that lists shares on an American exchange. In addition, the United States
exerts jurisdiction over a bribe or offer to bribe if any part of the conduct occurs
within the territory of the United States.
While early American enforcement efforts were tepid, the Department of
Justice became far more interested in prosecuting violations of the FCPA in the
late 1990s. Before 1998, the DOJ prosecuted less than three cases a year, but has
subsequently made FCPA issues a priority, prosecuting over twelve cases a
year.47 The cases have also become more significant with the government
prosecuting major firms, such as Halliburton, Kellogg, Brown & Root, and
Siemens.48 The SEC has also started prosecuting more FCPA cases, including
claims against J.P. Morgan's hiring practices in China.49
44 In addition, the act requires companies to establish internal accounting systems intended to
prevent firms from the creation of slush funds or otherwise willfully failing to prevent employees
or agents from making corrupt payments without the firm's knowledge. These accounting
provisions were arguably more important than the criminal prohibitions in the early years of the
FCPA because they required firms to take action to make themselves aware of foreign payments
even if the federal government fails to prosecute any illicit behavior.
45 Elizabeth Spahn, Implementing Global Anti-Bribey Norms from the Foreign Cormpt Pracices Act to the
OECD Anti-BribeU Convention to the U.N. Convention Against Cormption, 23 IND. INT'L & Comp. L.
Ri-v. 1, 8 (2013). See also United States v. Ko.eny, 582 F. Supp.2d 535 (2008) (determining that a
bribe paid to a government official in Azerbaijan is illegal under the FCPA even if the bribe-payer
qualified for immunity under Azeri law because he reported the payment to local authorities).
46 See Department of Justice, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (2012). This
definition is currently being challenged in litigation. The Eleventh Circuit has recently heard
arguments regarding the status of employees of state-owned enterprises as government officials.
See United States v. Esquena!i, Case: 11-15331 (11th Cir.).
47 Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(NYU Law and Economics, Research Paper No. 12-15 2012).
48 See, for exaple, Thomas 0. Gorman & William P. McGrath Jr., The New Era of.FCPA Enforcement:
Moving Toward a New Era of Compliance, 40 SECURITIES REG. L. J. 341 (2012).
49 See, for exarple, Neil Gough, JPMorgan Is Said to Drop Out of Another Offering in China, N.Y. TIM Es,
Jan. 21, 2014.
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After the passage of the FCPA, the US government attempted to persuade
foreign governments to undertake similar legislation." From an economic point
of view, the United States government did not want to harm American
businesses engaging in transactions abroad. US businesses faced an uneven
playing field for foreign business if they were bidding for government contracts
against firms who were not constrained from offering bribes. Thus once the US
government committed to a foreign anti-corruption policy, it was in American
commercial interests to have other states adopt similar restrictions. 51
In OECD and WTO negotiations, American officials pushed European
colleagues to apply anti-corruption laws to firms within their jurisdiction. 52
European governments were generally uninterested in following suit, tending to
view the FCPA as moralistic legislation that was naive regarding how business
operated in many developing countries. 53 In addition, European governments
recognized that the United States' unilateral action provided their firms with a
competitive advantage.54 The ability to bribe foreign state officials, sometimes
with the active assistance of home state embassy officials, permitted European
firms to offer contract terms that were more appealing to host state government
officials, particularly when bidding for large state procurement contracts.
Daniel Tarullo describes the bargaining over the OECD Treaty as
resembling a prisoner's dilemma game." He argues that all of the members of
the OECD could gain by mutually agreeing to prohibit their firms from bribing
foreign governments, but that each state was reluctant to give up any advantage
for their exporters. Tarullo quotes one politician who argued his nation's firms
needed the ability to bribe to compete against more efficient American firms. 6
Unsurprisingly, early negotiations were not successful. With the United States
so This article focuses on the OECD Treaty as the major multilateral anti-corruption treaty. After
the conclusion of the OECD Treaty, several other multilateral anti-corruption treaties were
negotiated. The most important of these is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
the first attempt at a global attempt to regulate corruption, which entered into force in 2005. .
Like prior agreements, the UN treaty requires governments to adopt national law that criminalizes
foreign bribes but does not set out enforcement requirements. Unlike prior agreements, it also
provides that states return any gains from bribery, such as the seizure of personal assets from
former government officials, to the host state. Most major economies have ratified the UN treaty
with the notable exceptions of Germany and Japan.
51 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 32, at S158-59.
52 Tarullo, supra note 12. American negotiators at one point even threatened to use trade sanctions if
governments failed to regulate their own exporters. Id. at 678.
53 Patrick Glynn et al., The Globalikation ofGorrption, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONomy 6,
22 (Kimberly Ann Elliot ed., 1997).
5 Tarullo, supra note 12.
ss Id.
56 Id. at 674 n.26.
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already committed to a policy of enforcing anti-corruption rules against its firms,
other states were reluctant to bind themselves to a treaty that would limit their
firms' range of action. It was not until the 1990s, when European governments
experienced their set of domestic corruption scandals, that interest in a
multilateral treaty gained traction.s?
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is largely an extension of the FCPA
to OECD member states.58 The treaty requires states to adopt anti-corruption
legislation that mimics the United States' legislation, including a ban on any
private payment to foreign government officials made to attain or retain
business. Like the FCPA, the legislation does not include exceptions for local
corruption norms (the idea of "this is how business is done here")."o The treaty
places an obligation on each state to enforce its own national legislation
governing private corrupt payments to foreign officials, but does not demand
any particular enforcement measures or discuss how enforcement should be
evaluated." As of this writing, forty states have ratified the OECD Convention;
the thirty-four members of the OECD and six non-OECD members (Argentina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Columbia, Russia, and South Africa)."
While the signing and ratification of the OECD Treaty creates an
international obligation for member governments to enact domestic legislation
prohibiting foreign corrupt activity, the incentives for states to under-enforce
this agreement remain. The same competitive concerns that made some states
reluctant to sign onto the OECD. Treaty may make some governments reluctant
to enforce their rules stringently.6 Transparency International finds that only
four OECD Treaty members are "active" enforcers of the agreement."6
Similarly, the OECD's own Working Group on Bribery regularly concludes that
s7 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 32, at S158-59.
58 Spahn, supra note 45.
s9 OECD Treaty and Commentay, supra note 30, arts. 1-3. Like the FCPA, the OECD Treaty also
establishes private record keeping requirements, see art. 8.
60 See OECD Treaty and Commentag, supra note 30, at 15 (stating that "It is also an offence
irrespective of ... the tolerance of such payments by local authorities, or the alleged necessity of
the payment in order to obtain or retain business.").
61 OECD Treaty and Commentay, suro note 30, arts. 5, 17.
62 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as
of 20 November 2012, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/antibriberyconvention
ratification.pdf.
63 See Pieth & Labelle, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that "[the internal enforcement of anti-corruption
is particularly important during the global recession] when some argue that winning orders should
trump fighting corruption.").
6 Transparency International Report, Exporting Corruption: Progress Report 2013: Assessing
Enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combatting Foreign Bribery (2013).
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many, if not most, OECD members do not undertake adequate efforts to
enforce the agreement." In short, the prisoner's dilemma continues to exist but
has been moved to the enforcement stage: some states may find a strategy of
formal compliance with the OECD rules (enactment of the necessary domestic
legislation) but lax internal enforcement of these rules to be optimal. Moreover,
the ambiguity of the OECD Treaty's requirements for implementing anti-
corruption law domestically makes such a strategy possible.
C. Criteria for Evaluating Domestic Enforcement Efforts
Although the OECD Treaty does not define what a state's obligations are
in terms of enforcing its own anti-corruption law, there are various metrics that
can be used to evaluate enforcement efforts. This section discusses the most
prominent two metrics: a resource-based approach (the level of government
police and prosecutorial resources) and an incidence-based approach (the level
of violations that occur within the state's jurisdiction). Both of these approaches
have important limits to evaluating state implementation of its national rules.
The most common means of assessing government enforcement is a
resource-based approach: an evaluation of the level of resources the government
has dedicated to policing and prosecuting private behavior. For instance,
Transparency International grades states' anti-bribery enforcement efforts based
on the number of prosecutions each pursues.66 This criterion is not inherently
problematic but it suffers from several concerns. First, treaties rarely specify
what level of resource engagement is necessary. As a result, governments are not
obviously in breach of an international agreement or failing to "live up" to their
obligations by failing to bring a certain number of prosecutions. While
governments may have to make a "good faith effort" to effectuate this
legislation, it is far from clear what level of resources constitutes a good faith
effort. If there is a low level of underlying illegal behavior, then low levels of
enforcement may be appropriate." However, determining the level of underlying
65 The OECD Working Group on Bribery provides a three-phase analysis of specific countries'
implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Treaty. These country reports regularly find that
states need to do more to enforce the agreement. See, for example, OECD Working Group on
Bribery's Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in South Africa,
5 (March 2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/SouthAfricaPhase3Report
EN.pdf (expressing that the Working Group was "seriously concerned" that the South African
government had not brought a single prosecution for foreign bribery in spite of its robust
domestic legislation).
66 See supra note 64.
67 For instance, the OECD working group on bribery notes that the New Zealand government has
the perception that it does not need to prosecute an anti-bribery case because New Zealand
businesses never engage in bribery. See OECD Working Group on Bribery's Phase 3 Report on
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illegal behavior is difficult given that private actors are unlikely to be
forthcoming about their illicit behavior. In addition, government officials cannot
count on injured private market actors to inform them of violations. Illicit
behavior may not be observable to other private market participants, and thus
injured parties may also not be able to reliably report these violations to their
host or home government."
Second, states are resource constrained and may prioritize law enforcement
goals over others." Resource constraints are an issue for all governments, but
particularly so for states facing budget crises. When evaluating whether the state
is making a good faith effort, this inquiry should account for the severity of the
state's other illegal activity. If the prosecution of foreign corruption cases will
siphon resources away from other law enforcement goals, such as prosecuting
violent crime or monitoring security threats, then low levels of resources may
again be appropriate.70 In addition, the absolute number of prosecutions may not
Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in New Zealand, 9 (October 2013)
(expressing concern with the "outdated perception" held by many in New Zealand's public sector
that domestic companies do not engage in bribery is holding back more rigorous enforcement
efforts). While one may wonder if every New Zealand business is, in fact, so virtuous, the
government's perception illustrates a broader issue. If the rate of illegal activity is low, it may very
well be appropriate for a government to dedicate few resources toward a specific policy goal (such
as anti-bribery or antitrust efforts) as compared to general law enforcement funds. However, the
probability of detecting illegal activity is also low if police and/or prosecutors are not educated or
trained to look for this type of behavior or are not incentivized to prosecute it.
68 Illegal transactions are often observationally equivalent to legal transactions. For instance, price
fixing resembles efficient market pricing in antitrust law. Similarly, government procurement
contracts that include bribes appear identical to corruption-free contracts. Only by observing the
negotiations surrounding the activity (for example, discussions to harmonize price or pay-offs
made by third-parties outside of the scope of contract negotiations) can a transaction be
determined to be illicit. Often market participants only have access to transparent outcomes-the
price of a good, the procurement contract-but these outcomes are typically insufficient to show
illegal action. Thus, though an injured market participant may suspect illegal activity, they may not
have access to the conclusive information.
69 A state's failure to prosecute cases does not necessarily mean that formal laws have no chilling
effects. Non-prosecutorial effects may exist to deter private actors from engaging in illegal
conduct even if the threat of prosecution is low. For instance, American banks have refused to
accept deposits from or make loans to small marijuana farmers, even in states where the practice
has been legalized and federal law enforcement officials have declared that small batch marijuana
farming will not be prosecuted. The lack of bank support makes engaging in the activity difficult
notwithstanding the lack of government enforcement. See Jonathan Martin, Medical-Marijuana
Dispensaries Run into Trouble at the Bank, SEATTLE TiMEs, April 29, 2012.
70 One means of addressing resource scarcity may be to delegate enforcement to private parties.
Private rights of action or qui tam legislation can effectively transfer to private parties the ability
to enforce these laws. See Paul D. Carrington, Private Enforcement of International Law, in ANTI-
CORRUPTION PolICY (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2013), 285-97. Private
litigation will still burden a state's judicial system, but private parties bear the monitoring and
prosecutorial costs. The efficacy of private litigation depends on a number of factors including
Vol. 15 No. 1102
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
be particularly revealing if the choice of cases is strategic. Antitrust, anti-
corruption, and intellectual property prosecutions all provide governments with
the ability to use law enforcement as a form of industrial policy: a state may
bring a large number of cases but disproportionately prosecute foreign firms as a
means of advantaging domestic producers."
Alternatively states' efforts could be judged based on the frequency of illicit
private behavior in its jurisdiction. For instance, the United States frequently
complains of the Chinese government's failure to abide by its intellectual
property right's obligations under the WTO's TRIPS agreement based on the
level of private intellectual property violations that take place in the country."
No state, however, can hope to eliminate all private violations (or even most
violations) of these types of laws. For instance, the United States government
arguably is a strong supporter of copyright laws, and yet private violations of
copyright law by consumers are rampant. The question is when the underlying
incident-level surpasses some critical threshold and whether the government is
aware of the level of violation.
Applied to anti-corruption measures, this method of evaluating whether
governments are abiding by their obligations is to monitor the underlying
incidence of foreign bribery by multinational corporations (or other private
actors) within the state's jurisdiction. States that have higher levels of corrupt
private activity would be less compliant with the agreement than states with
lower levels. The limits to this approach are two-fold. First, learning the
underlying level of private corruption is difficult information to gather. Because
these actions are criminalized, private actors will attempt to hide any evidence of
corrupt activity. As such, this is a highly speculative metric. Second, the treaty
does not establish at what incident threshold the state would be responsible for
taking additional actions. For instance, the United States is generally viewed as a
private parties' information on the illicit activity, the level of damages allowed under civil law, and
the availability of procedural devices (for example class actions). Governments may opt to not
provide private access to enforcement for various reasons, including concerns about over-
deterrence or the calibration of policy implementation. Most international economic agreements
do not require governments to create private enforcement mechanisms, although the TRIPS
Agreement requires that states provide private civil remedies for violations of intellectual property
law.
71 Choi and Davis find that the United States government fines foreign firms much more severely
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, even accounting for the size the bribe, the extent of the
corruption, the level of company profits from corruption, and other variables. See Choi & Davis,
supra note 47.
72 See, for example, Panel Report, China--Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, \VT/DS362/R (Mar. 19, 2009) (case in which the United States government alleged
that the Chinese government was not prosecuting violations of domestic intellectual property law
that were under a "commercial scale" threshold).
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significant enforcer of anti-corruption law, but no one claims that most incidents
of overseas corruption are detected or prosecuted.
In sum, the standards for evaluating whether a state is abiding by a good
faith effort to enforce its own market-engaging legislation are not well defined.
Unlike traditional international economic agreements, the obligations themselves
lack clarity and unambiguous baselines for judging the state's compliance. On a
spectrum of transparent to opaque, market-engaging agreements trend toward
the opaque, making these agreements difficult to monitor. Other states and
private actors cannot readily discern whether a government is complying with
the agreement by observing its public acts.
IV. EFFECTS ON THE INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF
ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES
For all of the domestic legislation and international agreements, it is fair to
ask whether the FCPA or the OECD Treaty have actually changed private
actors' dealings with foreign governments. Anti-corruption obligations may
simply be aspirational commitments rather than a policy priority. This Section
discusses state-to-state enforcement of anti-corruption measures. The first part
addresses how traditional interstate enforcement mechanisms, such a reciprocity
or sanctioning, have limited effect in the corruption context. The second part
then turns to current assessments of the OECD enforcement, which highlights
subsidiary enforcement mechanisms. This part discusses the United States'
approach of expansive overseas jurisdiction as a means to compensate for other
treaty's members weak enforcement practices.
A. Traditional Means of Interstate Enforcement
International treaty agreements have historically been enforced through
informal state-to-state mechanisms, such a reciprocity and retaliation.73 For
either of these mechanisms to be effective, states need to be able to (1) observe
the behavior of other treaty members and (2) interpret whether their actions are
consistent with the treaty's terms. Both these observation and interpretation
elements pose problems for the informal enforcement of the OECD Treaty. In
terms of observation, governments can witness whether their treaty partners
have adopted the requisite national legislation but cannot detect other key
variables. How high of a policy priority is policing and prosecuting foreign
corruption? Are police or prosecutors aware of any foreign corruption by
prominent national corporations but are failing to investigate for political
reasons? This information is critical to understanding the state's approach to
73 POSNER & SYKES, supra note 5, at 26-33.
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implementing national anti-corruption legislation, but is generally unobservable
to those outside of the state.
Interpreting whether a partner state's behavior is consistent with the treaty
is also challenging. As Section III detailed, the OECD Treaty does not provide
clear guidance on what levels of domestic enforcement efforts states need to
undertake. Instead, the degree of implementation is left underspecified. This
creates an interpretative question for states. Some treaty partners may
understand the treaty to require only formal compliance (that is, enactment of
domestic legislation) while others may understand the treaty terms to require
more rigorous domestic implementation.
Treaty members who interpret the agreement to have more demanding
domestic enforcement requirements can attempt to retaliate against treaty
partners that fail to bring prosecutions. For instance, the retaliating state can
threaten to withhold benefits from other forms of cooperation (such as trade
preferences, good diplomatic relations, intelligence reports) unless the target
state increases its domestic enforcement efforts. However, such threats of
retaliation can put the enforcing state in a precarious situation. Without a clear
standard determining that another state has violated its treaty obligations, the
retaliating state itself may be viewed as overstepping legal limits. Alexander
Thompson has described this as the "sanctioners' dilemma," where states
seeking to enforce international agreements through retaliation may themselves
be accused of violating legal rules if other states do not agree there has been an
initial breach.74 The more ambiguous the treaty terms, the greater the probability
that a sanctioning state will face pushback from its unilateral retaliation.
States are also limited in their ability to use reciprocity to enforce anti-
corruption measures. As discussed in Section III.A, it is difficult for states to use
reciprocity to enforce an anti-corruption treaty because tit-for-tat actions do not
punish the non-cooperative state.7 s For instance, if one state is lax in its
enforcement of its domestic rules, it is not materially injured if another state
decreases its enforcement in response. As a result, reciprocity may not be
effective in enforcing anti-corruption agreements.
However, reciprocity may have important impacts on the effectiveness of
the agreements. If a state suspects that its treaty partners are not rigorously
74 Alexander Thompson, Tbe Rational Enforcement ofInternational Law: Solving the Sanctioners' Dilemma, I
INT' THEORY 307 (2009).
75 Reciprocity is effective where the benefits of cooperation are excludable. For instance, in trade
agreements, an enforcing state can punish a breach states by raising its tariff levels in response to
the breaching state's decision to raise its tariff levels. The breaching state suffers a material injury
here because it is denied the benefits of the treaty. Reciprocity is less effective in other
situations-such as climate change or human rights-when another state's breach of the treaty
terms does not exclude the breaching state from cooperative gains.
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implementing the agreement, the state may choose to adopt a similar approach
and lower its level of implementation. Such reciprocal actions may lead to lower
overall levels of treaty enforcement as treaty partners adjust their expectation of
compliance lower."6 As the next section discusses, the generally weak level of
enforcement of the OECD Convention may be the result of such lowered
expectations.
B. Current Assessments of OECD Enforcement
Since the signing of the OECD Treaty in 1997, it is not entirely clear how
much the status quo has changed in terms of effective enforcement of anti-
corruption norms. All of the parties have enacted the necessary domestic
legislation, but prosecutions under domestic law have varied widely between
jurisdictions. Transparency International, which bases its enforcement ratings on
the number of prosecutions pursued, has rated only four states (ten percent of
the membership) as active enforcers: Germany, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Half of the OECD membership is ranked as
having little to no enforcement of the agreement.78 The United States remains
the most active enforcer in terms of the number of cases pursued, accounting
for over fifty percent of all OECD bribery prosecutions. Prosecutions for
foreign anti-corruption are rare outside of the OECD, although more
developing states seem interested in prosecuting foreign firms for in-state
corrupt activities.s
Transparency International's observation that most OECD Treaty
members have little to no domestic enforcement of their national anti-
corruption laws may be explained by a lack of trust between treaty members. If a
government believes that other treaty members will not adopt rigorous
implementation standards, then its optimal response may be to follow suit. Such
actions may be reciprocal but here, reciprocity is acting in a manner that
undermines the treaty's goals rather than supporting higher levels of interstate
enforcement.
76 In game theory terms, this situation may approach a "stag hunt" game where states only
cooperate if they trust that their treaty partners will cooperate as well.
77 Heineman & Heimann, supra note 36, at 83.
78 Id.
79 Id.
s0 In particular, the Chinese government is increasing its prosecution of foreign firms who bribe
local officials. See, for example, Peter Henning, Lessons from the Glaxo Case in China, N.Y. TiMis
DEALBOOK, Oct. 22, 2013 (discussing increased Chinese enforcement of domestic anti-
corruption laws against foreign firms).
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The United States seems to be an outlier in anti-corruption enforcement,
remaining an active enforcer among treaty partners who are weak enforcers.
However, the US domestic actions-particularly the targets of US
enforcement-may indirectly be a source of interstate enforcement. The United
States has adopted a very broad jurisdiction approach to implementing its anti-
corruption laws, casting a net wide enough to capture a lot of activity that has
only limited connection to American territory. Of the ten largest FCPA cases, in
terms of the size of the fine, nine of these cases have been against foreign
corporations. Stephen Choi and Kevin Davis examine the entire body of FCPA
prosecutions from 2004-2011 and find that the DOJ disproportionately
sanctions foreign firms relative to domestic firms, controlling for the size of the
bribe, the profits made from the corrupt activity, and the amount of economic
activity involved." The Choi and Davis study confirms that systematic
discriminatory effects exist, although they cannot isolate the specific cause.82
Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of cases (with lower fines) continue to
involve national firms.83
American prosecutors' decisions on how harshly to fine a corporation can
be considered a form of interstate enforcement. Prosecutors may believe that
they are balancing the disadvantage that American firms face through tighter
general enforcement by imposing harsher punishments on foreign firms that fall
within the FCPA's jurisdiction.84 Such prosecutions are not retaliation-the
United States government is not withdrawing any benefits of cooperation from
foreign governments-but they may be an indirect attempt to promote greater
domestic enforcement by OECD Treaty members. By expanding its domestic
enforcement of anti-corruption measures, the United States can attempt to increase
the international enforcement of the OECD Treaty by compensating for lax
enforcement elsewhere.
81 Choi & Davis, supra note 47. Choi and Davis do not attempt to control for the quality of the
evidence. See also Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Compeition and Anticorruption Law (University of
Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper Series 2012-09, 20, 2012) (discussing the possibility
of targeted prosecution).
82 Interestingly, Choi and Davis also find that foreign firms receive high fines when there is cross-
national prosecutorial cooperation. This indicates that the willingness of home state authorities to
cooperate with the DOJ and provide evidence does not lessen the sanction that the foreign firm
receives. Choi & Davis, supra note 47.
83 This might be targeting but it might also be a function of the size of the operation or the quality
of the evidence (foreign firms might be more open about their actions if they did not expect to be
prosecuted and thus taken fewer actions to hide evidence of foreign bribery).
8 Less strategic explanations also exist. Foreign firms may simply have less experience in negotiating
deferred prosecution agreements with the DOJ and therefore receive less favorable treatment. If
this is the case, there should be a learning curve for foreign firms and the gap between foreign
and domestic fines for similar activity should decrease over time.
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Such unilateral actions are not uncommon in international economic law.
Under the GATT system of trade law, commentators and government officials
viewed international enforcement of trade rules as weak. Dispute resolution
systems were governed by a consensus rule, which led to a slow and sometimes
ineffective enforcement system. Frustrated with the pace of enforcement
actions, the United States government undertook a system of unilateral
enforcement measures ("Section 301" actions) as a means of encouraging
compliance with GATT rules." The American unilateral measures were
controversial internationally; foreign governments alleged that the United States
was overly aggressive in its finding of violations and its threats of retaliation.
Nevertheless, the United States practice of unilateral enforcement created the
necessary political support among foreign nations for the creation of the World
Trade Organization's strong and more multilateral system of trade law
enforcement.
An analogous situation may be taking place in the anti-corruption field.
Generally, OECD governments are less than rigorous in their enforcement of
domestic laws prohibiting foreign corruption. This lack of rigor is effectively
permitted by the OECD. Treaty regime because of the treaty's internal
ambiguities concerning what level of domestic enforcement is necessary. On the
whole, this leads to a situation where governments have formally adopted strong
national laws but dedicate few resources towards domestic implementation of
these laws. However, a few states-most notably, the United States-are
interested in enforcing these laws (against foreign actors, rather than foreign
states) and adopt broad jurisdictional principles to extend their enforcement
actions as widely as possible. While controversial, such "aggressive"
enforcement of anti-corruption law may, in the future, create the political
conditions necessary to strengthen the requirements of anti-corruption treaties
and lead to a stronger and more multilateral enforcement system.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Anti-corruption laws are gaining greater prominence in international
economic law. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is the most significant
example of an international agreement designed to decrease the supply of bribes
from private parties to foreign government officials. From one viewpoint, the
treaty represents an important change in governments' views of the harms from
foreign corruption. OECD members, and some non-members, have jointly
85 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM:
AMERICAN'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 1, 1-2 (Jagdish Bhagwati &
Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990). The terms "Section 301" comes from relevant provision in the U.S.
1974 Trade Act. Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411, 2414 (2000).
Vol 15 No. 1108
OECD Anti-Bribey Convention
agreed to prohibit bribes and offers of bribes by private actors within their
jurisdiction. Compliance with the agreement has been very high if judged by the
adoption of national legislation. All of the OECD Convention members have in
fact passed domestic legislation implementing the agreement. From a domestic
enforcement viewpoint, however, it is unclear whether compliance with the
goals of the OECD Treaty is particularly high. The treaty itself contains internal
enforcement ambiguities regarding the extent to which governments must
intervene in the market to investigate and prosecute corrupt payments by private
actors. Thus governments can formally comply with the letter of the treaty that
requires a minimum-standard for national legislation and yet dedicate little to no
resources towards enforcement. Over half of OECD governments have failed to
engage in any serious enforcement efforts.
These internal enforcement ambiguities further hamper the interstate
enforcement of the agreement. The lack of a clear standard for enforcement
efforts makes it difficult for governments to sanction weak enforcers. Worse, the
expectation that other states will only weakly enforce the agreement may lead
other states to act reciprocally and adopt a similarly weak enforcement strategy.
Nonetheless, there are strong enforcement outliers among the OECD
membership. The United States, in particular, appears to prefer a high level of
enforcement regardless of other states' enforcement efforts. Germany,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom similarly appear to have independent
preferences for higher enforcement levels. These states may be able to increase
the enforcement of anti-corruption laws across the OECD indirectly by
adopting broad jurisdictional theories to reach private activity in weak
enforcement states.
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